An endogenous growth model is presented in which production uses a vector of capital inputs. Technologies for creating capital of different types vary by gestation period and productivity. Ownership of gestating capital must be "rolled over" in secondary capital markets in which transactions are costly. We study how reductions in transactions costs affect the equilibrium growth rate, the rate of return on saving, the volume of activity in secondary capital markets, and the term structure of asset yields. We give conditions under which reductions in transactions costs result in higher or lower growth rates.
INTRODUCTION
On any business day in New York's financial markets, tens of billions of dollars worth of securities change hands. Most of this activity takes place in secondary capital markets-that is, it rearranges the ownership of existing capital rather than channeling savings into new investment. What, then, is the contribution of these markets to capital accumulation and the process of economic growth? And what are the consequences of increasing or reducing the transactions costs in secondary capital markets for capital formation, asset yields, and growth? As these markets become larger and cheaper to access, is this necessarily growth-enhancing?
Opinions on these questions have varied widely. Keynes (1936) , for example, openly questioned the economic value of easily accessed equity markets. Levine and Zervos (1998) , on the other hand, argue that these markets can be a powerful force in stimulating real growth. This article undertakes an examination of these issues. It proceeds from the viewpoint that secondaiy capital markets mediate two competing forces that affect capital investment decisions: Much of the most productive capital is long-lived relative to the holding period of a typical individual investor, and-at the same time-investors desire the ability to convert assets into consumption cheaply prior to maturity. Secondaiy capital markets permit the reconciliation of these two forces. In particular, the availability of capital resale markets permits produced by each technology represents a distinct argument of a standard neoclassical production function; we focus here on the case in which different types of capital are not perfectly substitutable in production. Second, we assume that transactions transferring the ownership of long-lived capital are costly and that these costs are most significant (over the life of an asset) for assets of longest maturities.3 We then investigate the consequences that the size of these transactions costs4 have for the growth rate of real activity, for the volume of financial market activity, and for asset prices and asset yields.
Finally, it deserves emphasis that we focus on the economic role of secondary capital markets (or capital resale markets) along these dimensions. It is these markets whose role in the process of growth and development has been actively debated [again, see Keynes (1936) or Levine and Zervos (1998) ]. Thus we consider only transactions costs and the volume of activity in markets where claims to existing assets are traded. We do not directly analyze the placement of new issues of equity claims.
The results we obtain are as follows: A reduction in transactions costs in secondaiy capital markets necessarily raises the equilibrium rate of return on savings. Reductions in transactions costs, ceteris paributs, also favor the holding of long-relative to short-gestation (maturity) capital. An immediate consequence is that declining transactions costs also necessarily result in a larger volume of secondaiy capital market activity, since longer-gestation capital must be resold more times than shorter-gestation capital. However, the consequences of lower transactions costs for the equilibrium rate of growth are ambiguous and depend on the relative strengths of three competing forces.
First, since a decline in transactions costs does raise the rate of return on savings, it may tend to increase the economy's savings rate. If this occurs, it is conducive to growth. Second, a decline in transactions costs reduces the resource loss associated with the transfer of assets; this too is conducive to growth. However, by causing the economy to substitute toward more transactions-intensive investments lower transactions costs lead to more activity in capital resale markets. This diverts the savings of The reason why transactions costs are skewed by maturity is relevant to, but beyond the scope of, the present essay. The risks to market makers may be greater, or valuing assets and matching buyers with sellers may be more difficult, for assets whose payout is in the far distant future (Stoll, 1978) . The notion that transactions costs are higher for assets of long maturity has a significant empirical basis. For instance, referring to the Wall Stueet Journal of July 23, 1993, the bid/ask spread on a 3-month Treasury bill of the previous day was 0.005 percent of the price. The bid/ask spread on a 30-year Treasury bond was 0.062 percent of the price, and the bid/ask spread on a 30-year Treasury strip (a pure discount instrument, equivalent to a long-term bill) was 0.7 percent of the price. Thus these bid/ask spreads vary by a factor of 100 with maturity alone. This effect is, of course, compounded as a longer-term instrument is rolled over many more times in its lifetime. See Sharpe (1985) for a discussion of transactionis costs in equity (capital resale) markets. 4Reductions in transactions costs could occur either because the "technology of transacting" improves or because agents devise improvements in the organizational structure of these markets. A natural extension of our analysis would be to consider the level of transactions costs as endogenous. In actual securities markets, for example, the bid/ask spread is set (competitively or monopolistically) by market makers and/or specialists in the securities. The spread could then reflect the market makers' costs and attitudes toward risk. Indeed, it appears that some of the risk in asset prices is reflected in the bid/ask spread, and the spread is then incorporated in the equilibrium asset yield (Shen, 1993; Shen and Starr, 1998). However, we abstract from these issues here. young agents away from the initiation of new capital investments and into the purchase (from old agents) of already existing assets.5 The diversion of savings into secondary capital markets is detrimental to growth, and the magnitude of this diversion determines whether or not the increased liquidity of the financial system leads to an increase or a decrease in the rate of real growth.
When can the third effect dominate the other two so that reductions in transactions costs adversely affect growth? Loosely speaking, the answer is that when savings behavior is relatively interest-inelastic, and when capital of different maturities is relatively highly substitutable in production, the diversion of savings away from new capital investment and into the purchase of existing assets will cause the growth rate to fall as transactions costs are reduced. On the other hand, if the substitution possibilities between short-and long-gestation capital are relatively limited, transactions cost reductions will imply only small reallocations of investment and a small diversion of savings. It is in this situation that transactions cost reductions are most likely to be growth-enhancing.
Since the analysis allows assets of various maturities to be held simultaneously, the model also generates an equilibrium term structure of asset yields (gross of transactions costs). The term structure here is based on the transactions cost structure in the financial sector rather than, as is typical in the literature,6 on investor expectations and portfolio preferences. A law of one price prevails in asset markets: All investment instruments must generate the same rate of return, net of transaction costs. Rates of return gross of transactions costs on assets of different maturities differ by a compensating differential reflecting transactions cost differences. We take transactions costs to be largest for long-lived assets (see footnote 3), which require the highest returns (gross of transactions costs) in order to be held. The result is a familiar upward-sloping yield curve (gross of transactions costs).
Our interest in many of the issues just raised derives, in part, from the attention they receive in the development literature. Many economies have substantially less well developed secondaiy capital markets than the United States, and traders face much higher transactions costs. Development economists often argue7 that the high costs of financial market activity in most developing countries are a major impediment to capital accumulation and growth. The present model can be interpreted as an investigation of this view. Reductions in transactions costs can be regarded as a consequence of liberalizations and/or technical improvements in the financial sector. Our results then indicate the effects of financial deepening for capital accumulation, growth, and equilibrium rates of return. 5 In effect, lower transactions costs potentially have two effects on the aggregate savings rate. First, by increasing the rate of return on savings, a reduction in transactions costs may increase the savings of young agents. Second, a reduction in transactions costs can increase the trading of claims to existing assets and thereby reduce the initiation of new investments. We expand on these points in Section 5.
6 See Shiller (1990) Interpreted in this way, the possibility that a reduction in transactions costs can result in an increase in financial market size and, at the same time, can be detrimental to growth is more than simply a theoretical curiosity. A number of authors have noted that many attempts to stimulate financial market activity in developing countries by reducing the perceived costs of transacting in them have been counterproductive.8 We identify technical conditions under which this is possible, as well as conditions under which it is not.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model economy, while Section 3 defines a balanced growth path equilibrium. Section 4 examines the behavior of financial markets. Section 5 provides an analysis of the consequences of changes in the transactions cost structure. Section 6 discusses the term structure of asset yields, and Section 7 concludes.
THE MODEL
2.1. Entironment. We consider a version of Diamond's (1965) overlapping generations model with production, modified to allow for endogenous growth in the manner described by Shell (1966) and Romer (1986) . In particular, our economy consists of an infinite sequence of identical, two-period lived, overlapping generations. In each period a single final good is produced using capital and labor as inputs.
Let t = 1, 2,... index time. At each date t a new generation is born with N > 1 identical members.9 These agents are endowed with one unit of labor when young, which is supplied inelastically. Agents are then retired when old. In addition, young agents at each date have no endowment of anything other than their labor.
Let cit E R + denote the age i consumption of a representative member of the generation born at t. Each member of this generation has the homothetic utility The single final good is produced each period using a composite capital stock and labor. In addition, production is subject to the kind of externality described by Shell (1966) and Romer (1986) . In particular, if Kt is the (composite) capital stock employed by an individual producer at t, if L, is that producer's labor input at the same date, and if k, is the "average" per worker capital stock, then the firm's final See, for instance, Taylor (1980) , van Wijnbergen (1983 van Wijnbergen ( , 1985 , and Diaz-Alejandro (1985). It is not difficult to allow for intragenerationial heterogeneity or for population growth. However, since the addition of these features adds no substantive issues to the analysis, we abstract from them here. output is given by the production function'0 F(-k,, K, Lt)=A_k,1--:K,8L1-,-with 8 cE (0,1).
On the production side, our analysis differs from more conventional formulations in that we assume the existence of J > 1 different technologies for converting the final good at date t into future capital. We index these technologies by j = 1,..., J; technologies differ as follows: One unit of the final good invested in technology j at t produces R > 0 units of capital at time t +j, gross of (i.e., not accounting for) transactions costs. Thus capital production technologies are linear (as in Diamond, 1965) and vary by productivity (Rj) and gestation period (j). At each date there may be capital available from each of the J different technologies. We assume that different types of capital produced via different investment technologies are imperfectly substitutable, entering distinctly into the production process. For simplicity, we aggregate these different types of capital as follows. Let Kj, denote the amount of capital produced using technology j that is available at t. Then the composite capital input is given by the CES aggregator function Notice that a unit of the final good invested in technology j at t is unproductive until it matures at t +j. Thus the capital production technology is "Austrian" in character. Of course, this formulation implies that most types of capital have gestation periods that are long relative to agents' lifetimes. Naturally, this assumption is not intended to be taken literally; it is simply a device for generating the sale of claims to existing capital assets. We could as an alternative modify the analysis in the following way: One could imagine that all capital investments mature in one period and that capital produced by different technologies has different productive lifetimes. This would lead to an economy where different capital production technologies generate distinct payoff vectors, as opposed to our "point input-point output" formulation. Such a modification of the analysis would allow us to produce l() We thus generate endogenous growth by assuming an externality associated with capital accumulation. Mainy otlher enclogenous growth formulations will, of course, give rise to the same results we describe here. For example, in Bencivenga et al. (1995) we used a model where final goods are produced using a set of differentiated intermediate inputs and where there are increasing returns associatecl with the production of intermediate inputs. We could equally well have employed that formulation here. However, since our focus is on the consequences of transactions costs in financial markets for growth, we have opted to use the simplest possible model that delivers endogenous growth in this framework. We also note that analogous results can be obtained for steady-state equilibria in versions of this model that do not allow for sustained growth. On the latter point, see Bencivenga et al. (1994) .
IIThe case p = 1 is considered by Benciveinga et al. (1995, 1996) . The case where the different capital inputs are perfect substitutes introduces a number of complications that are avoided when p < 1. results very similar to those obtained here but at the cost of considerable additional complexity. We therefore retain the simpler "Austrian" specification. Finally, we note that differences in gestation periods have several familiar interpretations. For instance, lengthy gestation projects may require more extensive research and development, or they may simply involve longer "time to build."
Since agents are two-period lived, the use of capital production technologies with j > 1 requires agents to sell capital goods in process (CIP) in capital resale markets.'2 In particular, capital investments in technologies with j > 1 are unproductive until they mature, so these investments are "rolled over" by investors in secondary capital markets from inception to maturity. We focus on how the costs of transacting in these markets affects the level of both real and financial market activity.
For simplicity, we assume a proportional transactions cost structure. When one unit of technology j CIP is sold h periods after initiation (so that the CIP is j -h periods from maturity), the fraction a( j& E [0, 1) of the capital is lost. We assume that there are no transactions costs associated with renting capital or labor or with initiating the capital investment.'3 2.2. Trade. At each date there is a set of firms that rent labor and (ready-touse/mature) capital from households in competitive factor markets. Let Kj, denote that quantity of (mature) type j capital rented by a typical firm at t, and let L, denote the firm's labor input. Let rjt denote the real rental rate on type j capital at the same date, and let wt denote the real wage. Then a typical firm chooses a value On the household side, each young individual earns the real wage wt at t. Given this young period income level, households choose a savings level and make decisions about how to allocate their portfolios among different available capital investments. In particular, household savings can be used either to initiate new capital investments or to purchase existing CIP that has yet to mature. Let Si', be the amount of type j CIP14 that is h periods old (j -h periods from maturity) that is purchased by a representative household at t. Further, let Pt /" denote the price (in units of current consumption) of one unit of technology j CIP h periods after initiation. Since, by choice of units, one unit of current consumption invested in technology j initiates one unit of technology j CIP, Pi" = 1. Also, one unit of mature technology j CIP yields Rj units of rentable type j capital. Thus the market value of one unit of mature CIP is simply its rental value; that is, P" i = R1r1jt. For j > 1 and 0 < h < i, Pti "' will have to be determined.
Without loss of generality, we can adopt the convention that transactions costs are born by sellers of CIP. Thus a representative young agent chooses a vector of consumption levels (c , C21) and a matrix of capital investment choices (S/I,) to maximize tt(c11, C9D) subject to Equation (10) 15 In the aggregate, the fraction of savings invested in each techlnology and each time to maturity will be determinate, however.
BALANCED GROWTH PATHS
For the remainder of this article we focus on equilibria displaying balanced growth paths. Thus, in particular, we focus on equilibria in which k t + 1 k ut so that o-is the endogenously determined gross rate of real growth in the (per capita) capital stock. Along a balanced growth path, yt also will be constant, and we henceforth omit time subscripts on y.
In order to ease the exposition of the general case, we begin by describing the determination of a balanced growth path when there is only a single capital production technology (J = 1).
3.1. The Case J = 1. When J = 1, Equation (10) implies that y P=t1"I/Pt' 0 R1r1t.'6 Moreover, in this case, kft= k1, and a1 1, so that from Equation (5) Finally, for future reference, we observe that (ao-/dR)(RR/jo-) 1 + yVF(y)/F(Ky) ? 1. In particular, an increase in the productivity of the capital production technology must be growth enhancing when J= 1 and d)'(y) ? 0. This will not be true when J > 1. We now turn to a consideration of this case.
The General Case (J ? 2)
. In order to characterize a constant growth rate equilibrium when J> 2, we begin by recalling that P'? =-1 and Pri'J = R ;t hold for all j. In addition, we note that (5) and (14) imply that along such a path,
holds for all j = 1,.. , J. Thus the composition of the capital stock is constant as well. Equation (15) gives the composition of the composite capital stock-i.e., the terms kjtlkt as functions of the discounted present value of investment in new technology j capital. In particular, one unit invested in technology j today yields Rj units of type j capital (net of transactions costs) in j periods. This capital has a marginal product of a; PA j periods hence or, in other words, a marginal product of aj PA/(y)j when discounted to the present. Notice that kjtlkt is an increasing function of this discounted present value of marginal product.
We now use Equation (2) the definition of the aggregate capital stock and Equation ( ,IAkt is the rental value of kt units of capital at t. kt1/R, is the quantity of goods required at t -j to deliver k units of type j capital (net of transactions costs) at t; [kj-t/Rj]()i is the date t value of these goods.
As in the case of J 1, Equation (16) It is also the case, of course, that the equilibrium portfolio weights must sum to one. Therefore, Equation (21) As a final step, we note that the amount of mature type j capital (per capita) at t is simply the amount of type j CIP initiated at t-times the (net of transactions costs) productivity of technology j. Thus 
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Much of our interest centers on how changes in the level of transactions costs affect the rate of capital accumulation, the rate of return to savings, the volume of activity in secondary capital markets, and the term structure of returns. We now describe the equilibrium determination of these variables. savings away from the initiation of new capital investment and toward the purchase of already existing capital (in process). This is analogous to a reduction in the savings rate in conventional endogenous growth models and hence is detrimental to growth, ceteris paributs. Of course this does not imply that reductions in transactions costs necessarily reduce the equilibrium rate of growth, even though-as we will show-they necessarily increase the volume of secondary capital market activity. This is so because such reductions also raise y I.
Transactions Volutme. The real value (measured in units of current consumption) of purchases by young agents in secondary capital markets at t is given by the term qD(y)w t(I -
To make our point about the relationship between secondary capital market activity and aggregate savings more precise, we proceed as follows. Total per capita consumption at t, as a fraction of per capita output, is given by 
COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS
In this section we investigate how a change in the level of transactions costs affects the equilibrium rate of return y ' and the equilibrium rate of growth o I. We first show that while a reduction in transactions costs necessarily raises the equilibrium rate of interest, such a reduction has ambiguous consequences for the growth rate of the economy. After observing why this is the case, we proceed to a more complete characterization of when reductions in transactions costs are and are not growth-enhancing in the case J= 2. figure. Under the assumption that p ? 0, it is easy to see that Equation (29) defines an upward-sloping locus.
The General Case. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium loci defined by Equations (16) and (29). Evidently the locus defined by Equation (16) is vertical in the
The fact that Tj > 0 holds for all j implies that a reduction in transactions costs necessarily shifts the locus defined by Equation (16) to the right in Figure 1 . In particular, a reduction in one or more of the transactions cost parameters a j ll must increase at least one of the net-of-transactions costs productivity parameters R1. This, in turn, necessarily increases the (net of transactions costs) internal rate of return on at least one investment alternative. As a consequence, the rate of return on savings must increase.
In addition, it is easy to verify that p > 0 implies that a reduction in transactions costs (an increase in at least one of the values R1) shifts the locus defined by Equation (29) downward in Figure 1 . As a result, the equilibrium position of the economy shifts from point A to point B, with ambiguous consequences for the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. Thus lower transactions costs can lead either to an increase or to a decrease in the rate of growth. What accounts for this ambiguity?
A reduction in transactions costs affects the equilibrium rate of growth through three channels. First, as we have seen, such a reduction necessarily raises the equilibrium rate of return on savings y. If 4'(y) > 0 holds, one implication is that the savings rate of young agents will rise. This, of course, is conducive to growth. Second, an increase in any of the values Ri increases the (net of transactions costs) productivity of at least one type of capital investment. An increase in the productivity of investment is also conducive to growth. Since no transactions are required for one-period investments, R1 = RI; i.e., there are no transactions costs associated with investments in technology 1. Thus a reduction in transactions costs can be represented by an increase in the parameter R2. We now consider the consequences of such an increase. For simplicity, we consider the case in which F '(-y) = 0, and therefore, we henceforth simply write the savings rate as 4).21 Since essentially all the existing empirical evidence suggests that the interest elasticity of savings is fairly low, this should be a reasonable assumption. However, some of our results can be overturned if the interest elasticity of savings is sufficiently large; we comment further on this possibility below.
We can now state our results about how an increase in R2 affects the rate of return on savings, the level of secondary capital market activity, and the equilibrium growth rate. Investment is transferred from technology 1 to technology 2. But investments in technology 2 are resold, and hence some savings must be transferred away from the initiation of new capital investment and toward the purchase of claims to existing CIP. The strength of this effect determines whether the equilibrium rate of growth rises or falls with a reduction in transactions costs. The effect is strongest, of course, when there is a high degree of substitutability between the two kinds of capital production technologies or, that is, when p is relatively large. And the higher is the savings rate or labor's share, the larger p must be in order for declining transactions costs to reduce the rate of growth.22
Equations (36) and (37) give conditions under which a reduction in transactions costs will necessarily reduce the rate of growth. As is apparent from Equation (A.14) in the Appendix, reductions in transactions costs are most likely to be growth-reducing when the ratio o-*/y* is low. As indicated by Proposition 2, Equation (36) guarantees that o-* /y l < 1 holds. And Equation (37) must be satisfied when p is sufficiently near one or, in other words, when there is a high enough degree of substitutability between capital produced using the two alternative investment technologies. 22 Clearly, if @'(y) > 0 holds, this allows some of the additional investment in the purchase of CIP to be financed out of the savings created when the interest rate rises. This will tend to attenuate some of the adverse effects on the growth rate resulting from a reduction in transactions costs. (30) and (34) provide an empirical criterion for determining whether or not a reduction in transactions costs will be growth-enhancing. More specifically, it is apparent from Equation ( is the elasticity of the volume of secondaiy capital market activity with respect to a change in transactions costs when d'(y) = 0. A reduction in transactions costs will raise the rate of growth iff this elasticity is small relative to the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to a change in transactions costs. Since there are typically good empirical proxies for transactions costs such as bid/ask spreads and good measures of safe rates of returns and transactions volumes, it is a relatively straightforward matter to think about estimating both elasticities. Thus our results provide a basis for an empirical determination of whether or not transactions cost reductions are likely to be conducive to growth. In view of the fact that attempts to reduce the costs of transacting in financial markets have experienced mixed success in a number of developing countries,23 the existence of such a criterion has some practical importance.
When d'(y) = 0 holds, Equations

Taxing or Suibsidizinzg Transactions. The fact that a reduction in transactions
costs may have adverse consequences for growth raises the following question. Can there be a case on welfare grounds for taxing transactions24 in secondaiy capital markets? We now state conditions under which a tax on these transactions reduces the net-of-tax rate of return y* as well as the equilibrium rate of growth o-". The former consequence of a transactions tax lowers the welfare of all generations (since all our agents save when young). The second consequence lowers the utility of all generations after the first. Thus, when our conditions are satisfied, a tax on transactions in secondary capital markets is clearly undesirable from the perspective of economic welfare.
Interestingly, a tax on transactions can lower the real rate of economic growth even when d-/dR2 < 0 holds. Thus the possibility that lower transactions costs can be growth-reducing need not imply that a tax on financial transactions is growthenhancing.
We introduce taxes on transactions in capital resale markets in the following way: We assume that all sellers of CIP pay a constant proportional tax T on the gross proceeds of these sales.25 No tax is paid on the rental of mature capital or on the initiation of new capital investments.26 Finally, the government uses the proceeds of these taxes to fund expenditures that either do not affect agents' utility, or that affect it in an additively separable way. 25 Of course, it does not matter to allocations whether buyers or sellers of CIP bear this tax. 26 These assumptions mirror our assumptions on transactions costs. 27 If the government rebates the proceeds of transactions taxes to agents, it will generally matter how they are rebated. Rebates via lump-sum transfers to old agents will strengthen the results we obtain here.
Under these assumptions, our equilibrium conditions must be modified as follows. First, Equation ( The proof of Proposition 6 appears in the Appendix. Notice that there is a distinctly nontrivial set of parameter values that satisfies 1 -p ? ((1 -,B )/1 along with conditions (36) and (37). For all such parameters, increases in R2 will lead to a lower rate of equilibrium growth, at least along a balanced growth path. At the same time, the introduction of (small) transactions taxes also will lead to a lower rate of real growth. Thus, as noted previously, when higher transactions costs are conducive to higher rates of growth, this by no means implies that transactions taxes-or policies that are equivalent to transactions taxes -are also conducive to higher rates of growth. Moreover, given our results concerning the sign of dcy*/dT, it is clear that the content of Proposition 6 can only be strengthened by allowing for D'(-y) > 0.
What accounts for the possibility that d(r; /dR2 < 0 may hold at the same time as d8 d-/1TK=o < O? An increase in the tax on secondary capital market transactions is not equivalent to a reduction in R2 because it has no effect on the net productivity of technology 2. As a result, an increase in the tax rate on financial transactions can cause a shift in portfolio composition that causes more investment to be done via an "inferior" technology. This distortion is not conducive to growth, even though it may lower the volume of transactions in capital resale markets. Thus transactions taxes can easily have adverse implications both for real rates of growth and for welfare along a balanced growth path, even when dOo d/8R < 0 holds.
THE TERM STRUCTURE
In order to consider how changes in transactions costs affect the term structure of gross asset yields, it is most interesting to return to the general case J ? 2. In doing so, it is necessaiy to have a convenient parameterization of transactions costs. We therefore proceed as follows. Let increase in z. However, in any event, the "increase" in Aj+ 1(z) is smaller than the "increase" in Aj(z). Hence, if Equation (41) holds for all j, the effect of a reduction in transactions costs is to increase the "short end" of the term structure by more than the "long end." In other words, a reduction in transactions costs flattens the term structure. This result, of course, is reversed whenever Equation (41) fails for some values of j. When Equation (41) holds for all j, a flatter term structure is a signal of lower transactions costs. Thus a flatter term structure (cross-sectionally) should be associated with higher real returns-at the "short end" of the term structure. And of course, the relationship between the slope of the term structure and the equilibrium rate of growth depends on the kinds of factors discussed in Section 5.
CONCLUSIONS
We have considered an economy where the financial sector mediates two conflicting claims on capital: Long-lived capital may be highly productive, but wealth holders may wish to receive the return on their assets over a short horizon. Secondary capital markets accommodate these claims by allowing capital to be owned by a succession of investors. However, these markets also use resources and extract rents. The implied costs of transacting in secondaiy capital markets influence 28 Equation ( an economy's equilibrium return on savings, the equilibrium rate of growth, the volume of financial market activity, and the term structure (gross of transactions costs) of asset yields.
Reductions in the costs of transacting in secondary capital markets raise the return to savings (the "short end" of the term structure) and, under weak conditions, reduce the yield on the "long end" of the term structure. This increases the attractiveness of long-gestation investments (ceteris paribats), which also tends (again, ceteris paribus) to increase the volume of secondary capital market activity. This reduction in transactions costs has complicated implications, however, for the equilibrium growth rate of an economy. These implications depend critically on the degree of substitutability between short-and long-lived capital as inputs in the production process, since it is exactly this factor which determines how much savings is diverted away from the initiation of new investment-and into secondary capital markets-by a reduction in the costs of transacting. This observation permits us to provide some insights into conditions under which financial deepening will and will not be conducive to growth.
We conclude by offering some comments on the general issue of model specification. By analyzing an economy with long-gestation investments and two-period lived agents, we essentially have forced agents to transact in secondaiy capital markets. And our focus has been on what happens as the costs of participating in these markets change. We have particularly emphasized the consequences of changes in transactions costs for long-run capital formation and long-run growth.
There are, of course, other devices that could be used for forcing agents to participate in secondary capital markets. For example, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) generate activity in secondary asset markets by assuming that long-lived agents hold assets of varying maturities, that these agents are subject to idiosyncratic risk, that markets for insuring this risk are absent, and that borrowing/lending is sufficiently costly. Clearly, we could introduce some or all of these features into our analysis. Of course, Aiyagari and Gertler consider a pure exchange economy with a veiy pronounced market incompleteness. We consider a production economy with complete markets and analyze the consequences for long-run growth of resources being expended in these markets. It is not clear that it would be straightforward to analyze this issue using the Aiyagari-Gertler model. But, in any event, a hybrid of our model and theirs would yield a more interesting theory than ours of the relative demands for assets of different maturities. Such an investigation would be an interesting topic for future research. It is also straightforward to verify from Equation (31) that Equation (A.13') holds iff Equation (37) is satisfied. Thus Equations (36) and (37) are sufficient for Equation (34), as claimed.
To establish the remainder of part (d), substitute Equation (33) into Equation (A.12). On rearranging terms, the result is that Equation (34) holds. Obviously, a necessary condition for Equation (A.14) to hold is that Equation ( 
